SEGRET

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6 February 1967

NOTE FOR: Carl

SUBJECT: Comment on "Foreign Intelligence Collection

Requirements"

1. I have scanned the subject report pretty rapidly. By and large it is factual, well written, but, I suspect, another exercise in frustration.

- 2. The report concentrates heavily on the observable internals of collection requirements, and I feel it fails to treat properly items which are external and perhaps outside the explicit charter of the IG's group. This lack of understanding surfaces early when in I-16, paragraph 25, the theme is established that the CIA Long-Range Plan position that CIA must either be allowed to grow or the Government must curb its appetite is somehow incorrect. Perhaps the Long-Range Plan is not overly clear, but the fundamental problem which this group clearly saw was that emerging nations could quickly become technilogically sophisticated and hence rapidly assume positions of importance in the world. Therefore, if the criteria of what is important is maintained, the number of things in this world which get that label increase, and consequently the Agency must grow if the criteria is not changed.
- 3. I feel that Chapter VII "The Information Explosion" is most significant because it involves the greatest amount of judgment. The preceding chapters which treat different types of collection, etc., are pretty much a recitation of the facts with resulting recommendations. In Chapter VII, however, the report unfortunately focused largely on the internals, and while it is true that better management of collection, better specification of what is needed in collection can be helpful, what really must be cured is buried on page VII-10 and VII-20, i.e., "Thus one of our most important functions is educating the policy makers to ask the right questions and to know what useful answers they can rightfully expect from intelligence." The group has nibbled, but failed to bite the bullet. Chapter VIII deals with the responsibilities of

Approved For Release 2002/06/14 : CIA-RDP71B00185A0001000220056-0

-2-

management and here points out the mechanistic things which Division Chiefs, Office Directors, and Deputy Directors ought to do. To really put the cork in the bottle, the DCI and the President, along with the National Security Council, have got to do a bit of thinking about requirements: this isn't touched. Effective management does not proceed from an ensemble of techniques to help the lower levels in their daily tasks, but unfortunately that is about the bulk of what this report addresses.

4. By and large the recommendations are just right, and the need to have these recommendations implemented is pretty well substantiated by the documented facts. Given that the President of the National Security Council and the DCI are probably not likely to get into the over-all problem because the budget -- although large to us -- just doesn't hurt that much, working on the internals may be the next best and only practical thing.

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